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Wesley and Inclusive Grammar: 
A Note for Reflection
Randy L. Maddox, Ph.D.
The recent release of the Methodist Hymnal and the work underway on
a book of worship have escalated discussion of the issue of inclusive grammar
in United Methodist circles. When one surveys that discussion, it soon
becomes clear that the debaters (on both sides!) typically assume that the issue
is a forced choice: either we maintain historic Christian practice or we
conform to contemporary egalitarian sensitivities (witness the responses to a
survey on the issue by the United Methodist Reporter, 28 May 1990).
Both simple alternatives implied by this shared assumption are surely
theologically suspect. On the one hand, those who would champion an
unquestioning conformity to the supposed precedent of Christian tradition
forget the central insight of the Reformation period. Tradition can inform us,
but it must always be tested in light of the central 
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teachings of Scripture. If (as most would claim) Scripture affirms male/female
equality and God’s transcendence of human sex distinctions, then authentic
contemporary Christian linguistic practice should seek to embody these
convictions, regardless of previous precedent.
On the other hand, a nonchalant rejection of traditional precedents
simply because of contemporary sensitivities smacks of Enlightenment
arrogance and begs the question of theological authority. On what grounds
would we know that our contemporary sensitivities are true or normatively
Christian? Would it not, again, require appeal to the central convictions of
Scripture?
Without doubt, one could refine these simple alternative in ways that
would suggest greater convergence. However, it might be even more appropri-
ate to question the beginning shared assumption that historic Christian practice
is opposed to (or devoid of) the use of inclusive grammar. Careful historical
study greatly qualifies this claim.
An excellent example would be the precedent of biblical language. Pre-
paration for the new Revised Standard Version increased our awareness that
the original biblical languages often used inclusive terms for humanity in
contexts where existing English translations opted for noninclusive terms.
Moreover, it reminded us that even when noninclusive terms are found in the
original, the text should be translated in the context of the broader biblical
teachings about equality of male and female. As such, while scriptural practice
is somewhat ambiguous, one could well argue that it provides more warrant for
inclusive grammar than against this practice.
The specific point that I would like to add to the ongoing Methodist
discussion of the issue of inclusive grammar is that the precedent within our
own tradition is also more ambiguous than is often assumed. I refer in
particular to the linguistic practice of John Wesley. In doing so, I am not
assuming that Wesley’s precedent on this matter is automatically normative for
later Methodists. However, his formative influence must surely be recognized,
with whatever appropriate warrant that carries.
It is undeniable that both John and Charles Wesley typically used the
word “man” in contexts where they intended it as a generic term for 
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“humanity.” However, this usage must be seen in historical context. In Old
English the word man meant simply “person” or “human being,” with the
separate words wer and wif meaning an adult human male and female,
respectively. Over time wifman evolved into the word “woman” while wer
disappeared and man began to be used ambiguously both for an adult male and
for humans of both sexes. During the eighteenth century there was further
development as the word “man” increasingly narrowed its reference solely to
an adult human male.1
In other words, the Wesleys wrote at a time when the word “man”
could be used generically but was increasingly narrowing its meaning to refer
only to males. Reconsidered in this light, one can notice John beginning to
become aware of the limitations of the word “man” in his later writings. For
example, in his Journal entry for 9 July 1761 he speaks of the lovefeast as
having a design of free and familiar conversation “in which every man, yea,
and woman, has liberty to speak whatever may be to the glory of God”
(Journal [Curnock] 4.471, emphasis added).
Without a doubt, the most important example of John Wesley seeking
to avoid an ambiguous use of “man” when he wants to include both males and
females is to be found in his edited version of the Anglican Thirty-Nine
Articles, which he sent to the newly independent Methodist community in
America to become their Articles of Faith.2 This example is particularly
relevant to the current discussions of inclusive grammar because it involved a
formal public document, not just a personal communication.
On three occasions in his editing of the Articles Wesley changed an
original phrase “Christian men” to simply “Christians.” The first two instances
were obviously changed to make clear that both women and men were being
described (Remember that the original Anglican Articles were written during a
time when “man” was less ambiguously generic!). The first instance is
Anglican Article XXVII which had said that baptism was a mark whereby
“Christian men” are discerned from others that are not christened. The second
instance is Anglican Article XXX which stipulates that the Lord’s Supper will
be served in both kinds to “all Christian men alike.” The third instance is the
most interesting. In Anglican Article XXXII it is argued that it is as lawful for
bishops, priest and deacons “as for all other (emphasis added) Christian men,
to marry at their own discretion.” Wesley again alters this to simply
“Christians.” While the wording is ambiguous, Wesley’s alteration 
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allows the possible insinuation that both males and females could be bishops,
priests, and deacons! As Earl Kent Brown has shown, Wesley’s actual opinion
and practice on this latter issue was itself ambiguous, fluctuating over time.3
In short, while a cursory exposure to Wesley’s works might suggest
that he was unconcerned about the issue of inclusive grammar concerning
humanity, a more careful look suggests that he provides yet further warrant for
the contemporary efforts to render United Methodist public worship materials
in inclusive language.
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